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Recent theoretical and empirical studies have emphasized the fact that the prospect 
of international migration increases the expected returns to skills in poor countries, 
linking the possibility of migrating (brain drain) with incentives to higher education 
(brain gain). If emigration is uncertain and some of the highly educated remain, 
such a channel may, at least in part, counterbalance the negative effects of brain 
drain. Moreover, recent empirical evidence seems to show that temporary migration 
is widespread among highly skilled migrants (such as Eastern Europeans in Western 
Europe and Asians in the U.S.). This paper develops a simple tractable overlapping 
generations model that provides an economic rationale for return migration and 
which predicts who will migrate and who will return among agents with 
heterogeneous abilities. We use parameter values from the literature and the data 
on return migration to calibrate our model and simulate and quantify the effects of 
increased openness on human capital and wages of the sending countries. We find 
that, for plausible values of the parameters, the return migration channel is very 
important and combined with the incentive channel reverses the brain drain into 
significant brain gain for the sending country. 
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Abstract
Recent theoretical and empirical studies have emphasized the fact that the prospect of international
migration increases the expected returns to skills in poor countries, linking the possibility of migrating (brain
drain) with incentives to higher education (brain gain). If emigration is uncertain and some of the highly
educated remain, such a channel may, at least in part, counterbalance the negative eﬀects of brain drain.
Moreover, recent empirical evidence seems to show that temporary migration is widespread among highly
skilled migrants (such as Eastern Europeans in Western Europe and Asians in the U.S.). This paper develops
a simple tractable overlapping generations model that provides an economic rationale for return migration
and which predicts who will migrate and who will return among agents with heterogeneous abilities. We use
parameter values from the literature and the data on return migration to calibrate our model and simulate
and quantify the eﬀects of increased openness on human capital and wages of the sending countries. We ﬁnd
that, for plausible values of the parameters, the return migration channel is very important and combined
with the incentive channel reverses the brain drain into signiﬁcant brain gain for the sending country.
Key Words: Skilled Migration, Return Migration, Returns to Education.
JEL Codes:F 2 2 ,J 6 1 ,O 1 5 .
∗Addresses: Karin Mayr: Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria. email: Karin.Mayr@jku.at.
Giovanni Peri, Department of Economics, UC Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA, 95616. email: gperi@ucdavis.edu. This paper
was written when Karin Mayr was visiting the Department of Economics at UC Davis as an Erwin-Schr¨ odinger fellow funded by
the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). We thank Gordon Hanson for helpful comments. Peri gratefully acknowledges the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Program on Global Migration and Human Mobility for generously funding his research on
immigration.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
While the ﬂight of highly educated workers from less developed countries (brain drain) has a direct negative
impact on the average human capital and the average productivity of the sending countries, there may be
indirect eﬀects that importantly reduce this negative impact and may even turn it into a brain gain. Openness to
international migration may increase the opportunities for people in poor countries and increase their incentives
to get education. Recently the debate about the consequences of the brain drain has intensiﬁed1.S o m e
researchers have taken very strong stands in denouncing the costs of brain drain (especially in the medical
ﬁeld) for poor countries2, but other recent articles (Beine et al. 2001; Batista et al. 2007; Beine, Docquier
and Rapoport 2006) based on extensive empirical data of highly educated migrants point to clear evidence in
favor of the “schooling incentive” acting on remaining citizens. Our view is that, especially for middle income
economies (such as several East Asian and Eastern European countries) that have high rates of highly skilled
migration there is a further important and overlooked mechanism of ”brain gain” from international mobility:
the return migration of highly educated workers. There is anecdotal evidence that this channel may be already
very important for some countries3 and picking up momentum. We will review the literature and present new
evidence that demonstrates that return migration is not just a marginal phenomenon; in fact, one fourth of all
migrants return, and an even greater proportion in the case of the highly educated. Two questions then arise:
why do the highly educated return? And, accounting for these returns, does the international mobility of the
highly skilled look better for the sending countries? Moreover, in the presence of selective migration, who would
be more likely to leave? And who would be more likely to return? This paper provides a framework and some
numerical simulations to think about these questions qualitatively and quantitatively.
We develop a simple overlapping generations model of a small open economy in which optimizing agents
decide (in sequence) on the level of education to be acquired, whether to migrate and whether to return after
one period abroad. Using parameters from the literature and data (on the wage diﬀerentials, education returns
and migration and return ﬂows) from Eastern and Western Europe we analyze the impact of international
mobility on the average human capital (and wages) in the emigration countries. We choose these groups of
countries because we speciﬁcally have in mind skilled migration from countries with a medium level of income
per person to countries with a high income per person. The largest propensity to emigrate (except in the case
of wars and famines) overall and among the highly educated, is in fact among middle-income countries (such as
Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America) rather than from the poorest countries (such as sub-Saharan Africa).
1Early contributions arguing for a negative impact of brain drain on developing countries are Gruber and Scott (1966), Bhagwati
(1976), Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), and Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975).
2Remarkable for its extreme thesis and for the very inﬂuential outlet where it appeared was an article in the February 23, 2008
issue of ”The Lancet” a leading medical journal entitled: ”Should active recruitement of health workers from sub-Saharan Africa
be viewed as a crime?”
3See, for instance, the recent articles ”Brain gain for India as elite return”, The Observer, April 20, 2008 about returnees to
India and ”The Return of the Boat People” The Economist, April 24th, 2008, about returnees to Vietnam.
2Moreover the evidence shows that some countries in Eastern Europe and Asia have both large numbers of
e m i g r a n t sa sw e l la sr e t u r n e e s .O u rm o d e la l l o w su st oi dentify the sources of human capital gain and drain and
to quantify them given diﬀerent levels of international mobility. As done in the recent brain-drain literature we
summarize international mobility (from the poorer country) with a probability of emigrating, for people who
would like to do so. Such uncertainty captures the fact that due to restrictions, immigration regulations and
quotas, people who choose to migrate and thus select themselves into the ”line” of potential emigrants, often
do not succeed and therefore remain in the country. Besides the choice of education and migration, we also
analyze the choice of return. This introduces another potential margin for the sending country to beneﬁtf r o m
mobility of the highly educated because we consider that experience abroad enhances the productivity of human
capital at home. This seems in line with several recent case-studies that emphasize how returnees have been
important sources of entrepreneurship (McCormick and Wahba, 2004) and start-ups in high tech (IT) sectors
in countries such as India (Commander et al. 2004) and in the Hsinchu Science Park in Taipei (Luo and Wang
2004). Gundel and Peters (2008), analyzing immigrants in West Germany over the period 1984-2006, ﬁnd that
the highly skilled have a greater probability of re-migration relative to the less skilled, and that the share of
return migrants is rather large (between 40 and 50% of the immigrants re-migrate within 20 years). Zucker
and Darby (2007) ﬁnd that in the period 1981-2004 there was a strong tendency for ”star scientists” in several
science and technology ﬁelds in the US to return for at least some period to their country of origin in order
to promote the start-up of high tech ﬁrms (especially to China, Taiwan and Brazil). Our model takes return
migration seriously and shows how the beneﬁcial eﬀects of international mobility of highly educated workers are
aﬀected by it.
We ﬁnd that the possibility of migrating and returning to the country of origin has two positive eﬀects on
the average human capital and wages in the sending country. First, those individuals who plan to migrate and
return invest more in schooling since their return to schooling, while abroad and as returnees, is higher than if
they stay in the home country. This eﬀect is similar in spirit to the ”incentive” eﬀect emphasized by Elmenstein
and Stark (1998) and by Beine et al. (2001), and it suggests that permanent migration is not needed in order
to have the positive incentive eﬀects. In particular, if there is a wage and productivity premium for returnees
who are able to exploit, for instance, entrepreneurial abilities and skills acquired abroad, migration and return
stimulate education even more than permanent migration. Second, the return of workers with international
experience enhances the average human capital of the sending country. We simulate our model using parameter
values and data that mirror the diﬀerences between Eastern European and Western European economies. We
ﬁnd that in the long run it is plausible to expect a positive eﬀect on the average human capital of Eastern
European countries under looser migration polices. We also show that 25% to 50% of the human capital and
wage gains from freer migration accrue to the Eastern European countries through the return channel, which
3is in addition to the pure incentive channel studied by the literature so far. For a reasonable share of return
migrants (20 to 30% of those who emigrated) our model reveals that their role can be critical in evaluating
the beneﬁts of labor mobility to the sending country. Temporary migration with a ”productivity premium” for
returnees is the scenario which beneﬁts the sending country most.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on brain drain,
brain gain and brain return, emphasizing recent evidence of a signiﬁcant positive indirect eﬀect of emigration of
the highly educated on human capital through incentives and returns. Section 3 presents some new empirical
evidence on the characteristics of immigrants from Asia and Eastern Europe to the US and on their tendency
to return. Section 4 develops and solves a simple overlapping generations model in which workers in a poorer
country make decisions about education, migration to a richer country and return. The model provides several
insights into the key determinants of each decision in a country with no prospect of emigration and in a country
with increasing likelihood of emigration. Section 5 uses parameters from the literature to simulate the impact
of looser emigration policies. In section 6 we consider the eﬀect of a more sophisticated policy in which the
probability of emigrating depends on the permanent or temporary nature of migration. Finally, we look at the
eﬀect of emigration assuming there are positive externalities to human capital acquisition. Section 7 provides
concluding remarks.
2 Stylized Facts and Literature Review
The recent theoretical and empirical literature on skilled migration from less developed countries has reevaluated
the possibility that international labor mobility may beneﬁt human capital in the sending countries in the long
run. There are three channels that have been emphasized: incentives, remittances and returns. Beginning
with Elmenstein and Stark (1998) and followed by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001), Stark (2003) and
recent contributions by Schiﬀ (2005) and Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2006), the theoretical literature on
international migration of highly skilled workers has noticed that, at least in theory, access to international labor
markets, where returns to human capital are higher than domestic returns, may induce people in less developed
countries to pursue higher education. Such an incentive mechanism, combined with the uncertainty of migration
(due to immigration laws and procedures), may result in greater acquisition of education by people who end
up staying in the country. Whether this mechanism is only a theoretical curiosum or has empirical relevance
has recently been tested by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2006) using the database assembled by Docquier
and Marfouk (2006). While there seems to be some evidence of this incentive eﬀect at work, the combined net
eﬀect of brain drain and brain gain seems positive only in countries with low emigration rates. The analysis
of remittances in relation to emigration of highly skilled workers is not very large and does not reach strong
conclusions. While some micro-studies (such as Lucas and Stark, 1985) ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of education on the
4probability of sending remittances, at the aggregate level Faini (2007) ﬁnds that migrants’ remittances decrease
with the proportion of skilled individuals. In general there seems to be little evidence that more highly educated
emigrants remit signiﬁcantly more than other emigrants. The third channel, return migration, has attracted
renewed attention in recent years. On the one hand, several studies (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996, Dustmann
and Weiss 2007) show that the percentage of migrants who return within 10 to 20 years to their country of
origin is substantial (between 25 and 30% of the initial group). On the other hand, recent evidence for less
developed countries (Batista et al. 2007) and for middle income or fast growing countries (Luo and Wang
2002, Commander et al. 2004, Gundel and Peters 2008) emphasizes how the returnees may be particularly
concentrated among the highly educated, and are often among the most successful of them (Zucker and Darby,
2007). There is also evidence that very successful skilled workers are likely to return as entrepreneurs to their
home country (Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002), earning high returns to their human and entrepreneurial
capital. The interaction between the selection mechanism (who emigrates and then who, among those, returns)
and the number of emigrants and returnees determines the impact on human capital and wages in the sending
countries. If migration uncertainty provides incentives for people to get educated, and then highly educated
emigrants have high return rates, the worries about brain drain may be overstated. An important issue is the
empirical identiﬁcation of the share and characteristics of returning migrants. Some theories would predict
that only the less successful or gifted among emigrants return (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996). There seems to
be mounting evidence, however, that especially in fast growing countries (China, India, Vietnam) the returnees
are among the very best, because the country of origin pays a big premium for their international experience.
Dustmann and Weiss (2007) clearly show from UK data that the tendency of migrants to return to their country
of origin is much stronger among workers in highly skilled occupations (their Table 2) and that the migrants’
return occurs mostly within ten years of their arrival (Figure 3). Similarly, Gundel and Peters (2008) show a
much higher return rate for the highly educated compared with the less educated. The next section conﬁrms
that return migrants are a sizeable group and do not seem to be negatively selected. We provide some simple
statistics tracking immigrants to the US over the long run and assessing their likelihood of re-migration.
3 Some Evidence on Return Migration from the U.S. (1975-2005)
In this section we present some simple evidence, based on U.S. Census data, which we use mainly to characterize
the extent of return migration of foreign-born in the U.S. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) provide evidence from
the U.K. based on a similar approach to the one we use here. In contrast to their paper, we are more interested
in the extent of return migration once the immigrant has been in the U.S. for 10, 20, and 25 years, rather than
the fraction that return soon after arrival (1-4 years). Moreover, we are particularly interested in the return
migration of workers who moved to the rich country when young or very young, as they accumulate experience
5during their prime working years and return to their country of origin while still of working age. Such is the
scenario that best ﬁts the theoretical model developed in section 4. Those returnees are likely to be beneﬁcial
to their country of origin as they enhance their human capital and make it available at home. Simply measuring
the percentage of returnees and their education levels is very diﬃcult and requires several assumptions because
no dataset follows immigrants in the country of temporary residence and then back into their country of origin.
The U.S. Census data are certainly the most detailed and reliable source for consistently identifying immigrants
present in the U.S. along with their period of entry, age and education across decades. Hence, our approach is
to follow several cohorts of immigrants, identiﬁed by their period of entry in the U.S., over time, ﬁrst observing
them in the 1980 Census and then in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses and in the 2005 American Community Survey4.
In each year we measure the number that are left in the U.S. once we account for the mortality rates of the cohort
(which is not very large except for the later years since we consider only people who immigrated when young).
Such an exercise is complicated by measurement errors, due to misreporting of the year of entry in successive
Censuses, and the small size of some cohorts which may then exacerbate this problem. More importantly we
also notice that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (the ”Amnesty”) probably induced many
undocumented late entrants to declare an earlier date of entry to beneﬁt from the legalization. This makes the
recording of the cohorts entering in the 1980-1985 and 1985-1990 periods particularly imprecise (in fact, in the
Census data these cohorts increase signiﬁcantly in size from 1990 to 2000, which is impossible) and particularly
so for Central American immigrants (likely to be the group most aﬀected by the Amnesty). For later cohorts
(post-1990) we do not have enough years to characterize their return behavior after 10-20 years, so we choose to
focus on cohorts that entered the U.S. in the 1975-1979 period and were ﬁrst observed in a Census in year 1980.
This cohort of immigrant is interesting, ﬁrst because we observe 25 years of its history and hence we can record
their long-run return behavior. Second, this cohort was also analyzed in an earlier study of return migration by
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) who were, however, only interested in the short-run return, speciﬁcally between
their arrival and 1980. They found that 17% of the full sample of immigrants had left the U.S. before 1980 and
for some groups (European and Latin American) this share was even higher. Our analysis considers those who
stayed at least up to 1980, therefore accumulating between 1 and 5 years of experience in the United States,
and analyzes their permanence patterns afterwards. The other assumption made here is that living workers not
in the U.S. are likely to be back in their country rather than in a third country.
Table 1 shows the data for four cohorts (aged 13-17, 18-22, 23-27 and 28-32 when entering the U.S.) who
entered in 1975-1979, over the 1980-2005 period, including immigrants from all countries. The values reported
in the rows labeled ”Males”, ”Females” and ”Total” are the shares of living persons in the respective group
still resident in the US, once we account for the speciﬁc mortality rates of the cohort using the mortality rates
4The data are from Ruggles et al. (2005).
6relative to the age groups by sex and year as reported by the National Center of Health Statistics (2008). On
average the share of immigrants that arrived in 1975-79 remaining in 2000-2005 is around 0.8 with some cohorts
leaving in larger and others in lower proportions. In the aggregate group (age 13-32 at entry, reported in the
last section of Table 1) there is not much diﬀerence between the permanence rates for men and women, as
they are between 0.79 and 0.80 as of year 2000. In general, measurement error can be large and can pollute
the estimates. This is conﬁrmed by the fact that for several groups the percentage of remaining migrants in
1990 is smaller than for year 2000 (which is impossible unless a signiﬁcant group of people migrated back and
forth between their country and the U.S. and the respondents identify correctly the year of original entry in
the U.S.). The average value for the ”staying rate” as of 2000-2005 is about 0.8, implying that even in a
place such as the U.S., where people often believe that immigrants come to stay, and even selecting only the
immigrants who stayed at least 1-4 years, we still observe a re-migration rate of about 20%. It is particularly
interesting to distinguish the pattern of re-migration by country of origin. We report the rate of permanence by
cohort and gender for Eastern European Immigrants in Table 2 (our simulation in section 5 considers the case
of Eastern Europe as a reference). The rate of permanence for Asian immigrants is reported in Table 3 and
for Latin Americans in Table 4 (the largest group). Three interesting patterns emerge from the comparison.
First, for both Eastern European and Asian immigrants the re-migration rate for the cohorts of people who
entered when young is between 15 and 25% within the 25 years considered. This is similar to the behavior of the
group inclusive of all immigrants. The staying rates for male immigrants from Eastern Europe and Asia is also
represented in Figure 1 and for both sexes is reported in Figure 2. For some cohorts the percentage is higher
and for some a bit lower but on average it is safe to interpret the numbers as implying a 20% re-migration rate,
most of whom left within the ﬁrst ten years. Second, Asian and Eastern European male individuals (likely to
be working and the main source of income in the family) have, in general, somewhat larger re-migration rates,
so that between 20 and 25% of males returned from the U.S. Third, and most interestingly, Latin Americans
have a very diﬀerent re-migration pattern. They essentially did not re-migrate and in many cases (because
of measurement errors, re-classiﬁcation of possibly undocumented immigrants and under-reporting in the early
years) the share of remaining immigrants who entered in 1975-1979 is above 1 or very close to it. For this reason,
the group of Latin Americans serves as somewhat of a control. Assuming that most Latin Americans from the
considered cohort remained in the U.S., this implies that in most cases the mismeasurement and reclassiﬁcation
errors led to an upward bias of the shares of those who stay (as they are systematically above one for this group).
The upward bias seems particularly serious in 2000. This would imply that the estimates of staying rates for
other groups (and for the total) might be upwardly biased as well so that remigration rates of 20%-25% may be
a lower bound, implying that rates between 25 and 35% are not unreasonable.
Harder to read is the evidence regarding the selection of re-migrants along the skill (schooling) dimension.
7We report for each cohort the share of people with some college education or more. Table 1 shows that in
most cases (except for the youngest group who entered at 13 and was in large part still in school as of 1980)
the share of highly educated individuals does not change much. In general it increases by between 1 and 3
percentage points. Such an increase is the combination of two eﬀects: education upgrading by individuals from
the cohort once in the U.S., and selective out-migration. Interestingly, similar increases in the share of highly
educated individuals are observed among immigrants from all countries (Europe, Asia and Latin America).
Since we know that for Latin American immigrants there was essentially no out-migration we can infer that an
educational upgrading of 2 to 3 percentage points is reasonable for most immigrant cohorts. That would imply
that the out-migrants are not negatively selected in each cohort (as originally argued in Borjas and Bratsberg
1996) since the remaining people in each cohort have a share of highly educated which is rather stable or is
increasing by only 2 to 3 percentage points (consistent with education upgrading). While there is not strong
evidence of a positive selection of return migrants (which would imply a signiﬁcant reduction in the share of the
highly educated in the cohort) there seems to be at least a neutral selection and maybe a moderately positive
one if, for some groups, the education upgrading of the cohort was larger than for Latin American immigrants.
All in all, the long-run analysis of return migration of foreign-born in the U.S. suggests that return-rates
of 20-30% after 20 years are, in general, quite reasonable and particularly likely for immigrants returning to
middle-to-low income countries such as Eastern Europe and Asia. Immigrants from Latin America, however,
seem to return at much lower rates, if at all. Finally, there is no evidence of negative selection of return-migrants
along the educational range.
4 The Model
4.1 Production and Wages
Consider an economy (the Home country, indicated with an H) with heterogeneous workers (indexed by i)w h o
produce one non-durable good Y according to the following aggregate production function:
Y = AHLHχ (1)
where AH indicates total factor productivity (TFP), LH equals total employment and χ deﬁnes the average
human capital in the economy. Each individual j supplies one unit of labor and χi units of human capital
so that the average human capital χ is equal to 1
LH
PLH
1 χi. As is customary in the ”Mincerian” approach to
human capital, we assume that the human capital of each individual is an exponential function of her schooling,
hi,s ot h a tχi = eηHhi where η
H represents the returns to schooling in the home country. The production
8function exhibits constant returns to scale in total labor (and omits physical capital) so that it can be thought
of as a long-run production function in which capital adjusts to keep the capital-output ratio constant and
the productivity of a worker is determined by TFP and by her level of human capital. In fact, the marginal
productivity (and wage) in the Home country of worker i in logarithmic terms is given by:
ln(wHi)=l n ( AH)+ηHhi (2)
Assuming a production function in the Foreign country (F) similar to (1) with country-speciﬁc total factor
productivity and country-speciﬁc returns to schooling, the wage that individual i would earn abroad is:
ln(wFi)=l n ( AF)+ηFhi (3)
S i n c ew ea r ec o n s i d e r i n gt h ei s s u eo fe m i g r a t i o nf r o mar e l a t i v e l yp o o rc o u n t r yw ea s s u m et h a tl n ( AH) <
ln(AF) so that part of the wage diﬀerential between countries is due to diﬀerent productivity levels (in favor of
F,t h er i c hc o u n t r y ) . Moreover, following the literature on ”appropriate technological choice” and skill-biased
technological progress (e.g. Acemoglu 2002, Caselli and Coleman 2006), we assume that the returns to schooling
are higher in Foreign than at Home because a larger share of highly educated workers in that country induces
the adoption of technologies that use human capital more eﬃciently, so that ηH <η F
5.
The agents in the Home economy are described by an overlapping generations structure. They live 2 periods
(denoted as 1 when they are young and 2 when they are old) and they can decide at the beginning of the ﬁrst
period whether to migrate and at the beginning of the second period whether to stay in Foreign or come back to
Home. At the beginning of the ﬁrst period they also decide how much education (schooling) to get and they pay
its cost. To simplify the consumption side of the model we assume that there are no ﬁnancial markets so that in
each period people use all their wage income purchasing good Y . Moreover, we assume that the agent’s utility
function is separable over time and logarithmic in each period so that expressions (2) and (3) also represent the
period utility from working (and living) at Home (2) or Abroad (3)6.
As there is no uncertainty in wages, in order to generate a non-trivial decision about migrating back or
staying in Foreign at the beginning of the second period we assume that Home workers who have been abroad
for one period have ”enhanced” their human capital by learning new skills and techniques. If they decide to
return, this would increase their earnings per unit of initial human capital (as an augmentation of their human
capital). This extra beneﬁt, however, would not be reaped if they stayed in Foreign where they would simply
5Grogger and Hanson (2008) argue that the return to education is generally higher in countries of emigration, while the absolute
wage diﬀerence between skilled and unskilled is higher in the immigration countries. We use the assumption ηH <η F as it is
empirically true for Eastern and Western Europe, which is the case we analyze in our simulation.
6Grogger and Hanson (2008) argue that the selection of migrants (who are prevalently highly skilled) is better described by a
linear utility and linear ﬁxed costs of migrating (rather than both being logarithmic). While the qualitative feature of our model
would not change, the calibration results would. We explore the linear alternative as an extension to this model.
9have the same returns in the second period as they did in the ﬁrst. This assumption is justiﬁed by evidence that
highly-skilled returnees to middle-income countries often engage in entrepreneurial activities and act as skilled
entrepreneurs7 earning an extra-premium on their skills. Moreover, some middle-income countries, especially
those that are rapidly climbing the development ladder, place a premium on highly skilled workers who have
had experience abroad. A simple way to capture this ”return premium” is to represent the (logarithmic) wage
of a person who returns to the home country in the second period of her life after having been abroad as:
ln(w2
FH)=l n ( AH)+ηH(κhi)( 4 )
where w2
FH indicates the wage in the second period of life (superscript) for individual j who has been abroad
and returned home. The parameter κ>1 is a scaling factor for human capital associated with the experience
abroad. If the individual chooses to remain abroad in the second period, she will still earn wage (3). The
relevant case in our analysis that would lead to return migration is when ηHκ>η F, and we restrict ourselves to
such a case, providing empirical justiﬁcation for it in section 5. Finally, we assume that there are costs of living
abroad (material as well as psychological) and that those costs are speciﬁc to the period of the individual’s life.
We express these costs in utility units and denote them by M1 and M2 where the subscripts refer to the period
in which they are incurred. In general, we consider as relevant the case in which M1 and M2 are large enough
so that not all workers from Home move to the Foreign country8. At the same time it makes sense to think
that the costs of living abroad decrease from the ﬁrst to the second period following migration (as adjustment
to the new country, including the integration and adoption of local customs, would make it more pleasant to
live abroad) so that M2 <M 1 and possibly M2 < 0 if there is a cost of returning once settled abroad. Finally,
if ηHκ>η F and the net gains from returning increase with the human capital of workers, hi,t h e ni no r d e rf o r
some people to stay abroad in the se c o n dp e r i o di tm u s tb et h a tl n ( AF) − M2 > ln(AH)9.S i n c et h em a j o r i t y
of migrants does not return, we assume that this condition holds as well.
4.2 Migration and Return
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period (youth) individual i chooses how much schooling to get, hi, and simulta-
neously pays the cost, ki, for this education. Immediately afterwards (still at the beginning of period 1) she
7For instance, Luo and Wang (2004) show that in the Hsinchu Science Park in Taipei a large share of companies was started
and run by returnees. McCormick and Wahba (2001) show a high probability of literate returnees to invest their own savings and
be entrepreneurs. Commander, Chanda and Winters (2004) ﬁnd that Indian IT ﬁrms in 2000 reported a large shares of their most
skilled workers as having international experience. Finally Zucker and Darby (2007) show that many international star scientists in
the ﬁeld of biotechnologies in the 1980-2000 period (a key period for high-tech startups) returned from the U.S. to their country of
origin, ultimately having a very positive eﬀect on their origin country. China, Taiwan and Brazil seem to be net receivers of these
star scientists over that period.
8The formal condition for this restriction to hold is stated in section 5.1.
9If the inequality does not hold, then the worker with lowest human capital who migrated would return and therefore all the
others would, too.
10also chooses whether to be considered for the possibility of migrating. We treat migration as a lottery. It is a
voluntary decision whether to participate in the lottery or not. Once an individual has entered the lottery she
faces the same probability of migrating as any other participant10. We index the decision to enter the lottery
with the variable li, which takes a value of 0 if the individual does not participate and 1 if she does. Once the
education and lottery decisions are resolved, the individual participates in production and earns the wage in
the home country (if she stayed out of the lottery or entered but was not selected to migrate) or abroad if she
entered the lottery and was selected as a migrant. The probability of being selected as a migrant is p ∈ [0,1].
At the beginning of the second period people who remained at Home continue to earn wage wHi (we assume
that the cost of moving in the second period is too high to make it proﬁtable or that the receiving country has a
policy which signiﬁcantly penalizes the immigration of older workers), while emigrants living abroad can decide
whether to stay in Foreign or to return. We index their decision to return with the indicator variable qi,w h i c h
t a k e sav a l u eo f0i ft h ep e r s o ns t a y sa b r o a da n do f1i fs h er e t u r n s .
The only uncertainty in the model is given by the uncertain migration prospects for workers who enter the
migration lottery. Other than that, workers know their salary at Home and in Foreign and for simplicity we
assume that productivity and returns to schooling do not change. The optimal decisions of the individuals can
easily be obtained by starting with her last period and proceeding backwards. If the individual remains at
Home during her ﬁrst period, her utility in the second period is ln(wH) and no choice is needed; if she migrated
in the ﬁrst period she has to decide whether to return (qi =1 )o rn o t( qi =0 ) , and such a choice depends on
whether the utility of living abroad net of the costs, ln(wF) − M2, is larger or smaller than the utility from
returning ln(wHF). Substituting expressions 3 and 4 into the inequality one easily obtains the optimal choice
q∗












Since the beneﬁts of returning increase with the human capital level, only individuals with high education
would beneﬁt enough to oﬀset the diﬀerence between productivity net of costs abroad, ln(AF) − M2,a n d
productivity at home ln(AH). Plugging in the optimal decision regarding whether to return or not, we can solve
the ﬁrst period inter-temporal optimization with respect to the decision to enter the lottery (li) and the amount
of human capital acquired. The lifetime expected utility of agent i is:
10The uncertainty from the migration decision stems from quotas, restrictions and rules imposed by the immigration policy of
rich countries. In section 6 below we analyze the case in which the lottery does not assign equal probability to all applicants but
discriminates according to either their observed education or the period of stay (permanent versus temporary).





















1+δ is the inter-temporal discount factor, and ki is the individual utility cost of acquiring human
capital, which we assume to depend on the innate abilities of individual i, νi, distributed over an interval [ν,ν].
The variable q∗
i denotes the optimal decision about whether to return or not. As in models in which schooling
signals individual abilities, the costs of schooling are decreasing in individual ability and convex in the amount






where θ is an exogenous shifter of schooling costs. Since the decision to enter the immigration lottery is
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The parameter restrictions imposed above imply that the denominator of the right hand side expression
(2+δ)(ηF −ηH)+q∗
i (κηH −ηF) is certainly positive. Hence, only workers with human capital above a certain
threshold would enter the lottery, since they would proﬁt from migration. Notice that the probability of ”winning
the migration lottery” p does not aﬀect the threshold level of human capital determining the decision to enter
the lottery. The reason is simple: workers with human capital above the threshold are those whose utility, net of
costs, increases by migrating. Hence, they would take any probability of migrating over the certainty of staying.
Those who do not participate (with human capital below the threshold) are better oﬀ not migrating.
The two functions (5) and (9) deﬁne two thresholds. One that we call hS deﬁnes the lowest educational level
for which it is beneﬁcial to emigrate and the other hRM deﬁnes the lowest human capital level for which it is
12beneﬁcial to migrate and return in the second period. Permanent migration exists only if hS <h RM,i nw h i c h
case some workers migrate and stay abroad and others return. If hS >h RM, all migrants (still selected among
the highly educated) are temporary (i.e. return during the second period).
Putting together conditions (5) and (9) and assuming that hS <h RM (which is the relevant case for the
parameter choice in 5.1) we can partition the range of schooling levels of workers into three intervals. For a
level of human capital below the following threshold:
hi <
M1(1 + δ)+( 1− qi)M2 − (ln(AF) − ln(AH))(2 + δ)
(2 + δ)(ηF − ηH)
≡ hS (10)
workers choose to stay at Home (hence l∗
i =0 ,q∗
i = 0) in both periods. For human capital between the
values:
M1(1 + δ)+( 1− qi)M2 − (ln(AF) − ln(AH))(2 + δ)
(2 + δ)(ηF − ηH)
<h i <
ln(AF) − ln(AH) − M2
ηHκ − ηF
(11)
workers choose to enter the migration lottery and, conditional on emigrating, they stay in the destination
country (l∗
i =1 ,q∗
i = 0), while if they ”lose the lottery” they will stay in the Home country in both periods.
Finally, for values of human capital larger than the threshold hRM (RM for return migration) deﬁned in (12)
workers choose to enter the lottery and, conditional on emigrating, they return to the Home country in their
second period of life (l∗
i =1 ,q∗
i =1 ) .
hi >
ln(AF) − ln(AH) − M2
ηHκ − ηF
≡ hRM (12)
4.3 The Schooling Decision
Diﬀerentiating (6) with respect to human capital hi, and keeping in mind that q∗
i and l∗
i are equal to either 0 or
1 so that we only need to keep track of the thresholds hS and hRM, optimal schooling is given by the following





ip(ηF − ηH)) + 1
1+δlipq∗
i (ηHκ − ηF)
2θ
νi (13)
Such a relationship depends on the subsequent optimal choice of participating in the migration lottery and
of returning. Those choices in turn depend on the values of hi relative to the thresholds. The easiest way
to analyze the optimal choice of schooling and migration as a function of νi is to consider the three diﬀerent
migration choices and plot, for each one of them, the optimal schooling choice as a function of νi. This gives















(ηH + p(ηF − ηH))νi for l∗
i =1 ,q∗
















where the notations hS∗
i , hMM∗
i ,h MR∗
i indicate, respectively, the optimal amount of schooling for people
who stay at Home (S), for people who migrate and remain abroad (MM) and for people who migrate and return
(MR). It is clear from the coeﬃcients that the linear relationship between abilities νi and schooling hi becomes
steeper as workers decide to migrate and to migrate and return. The optimal functions in (14) together with
the threshold values (10) and (12) determine the correspondence between individual quality νi, schooling and
migration decision. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between νi and h∗
i and reports the threshold values (10)
and (12) determining the migration behavior. The ﬁgures show that workers of ability lower than νS , formally
given by expression (15) below, choose to acquire relatively little education and not even enter the immigration
lottery (l∗
i =0 ,q∗




1+δ(ηH + p(ηF − ηH))
M1(1 + δ)+M2 − (ln(AF) − ln(AH))(2 + δ)
(2 + δ)(ηF − ηH)
(15)
For ability levels between νS and νRM (deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n1 6b e l o w )w o r k e r sc h o o s et oa c q u i r ea ni n t e r -







1+δ(ηH + p(ηF − ηH)) + 1
1+δp(ηHκ − ηF)
ln(AF) − ln(AH) − M2
ηHκ − ηF
(16)
Finally, for ability levels larger than νRM workers enter the migration lottery and return to the Home
country in the second period of their lives (l∗
i =1 ,q∗
i = 1). The three bold, red segments in Figure 1
represent the schooling levels of the three groups of workers: those who stay, temporary migrants and returning
migrants. Those with low ability (below νS) get low education and do not even attempt to migrate. Those
with intermediate ability (between νS and νRM) attempt to migrate and if they succeed (with probability p)
they stay abroad in both periods. Those with high ability (above νRM) attempt to migrate and if they succeed
they return Home in the second period. These features are consequences of the key assumptions that ηF >η H
and ηHκ>η F. Namely, the Foreign country pays a higher schooling premium to workers, but the human
capital premium at home for returnees makes the prospect of migrating and returning for some highly educated
individuals even more attractive than permanent migration. While the chosen range of parameters in section
145 implies that the ability threshold for migrating νS is well below the ability threshold νRM, it is in principle
possible that the opposite is true and νRM <ν S. Such a case arises for small values of ηF (though it still must
be larger than ηH ) and very large values of κ11. In that case the ”intermediate” group of permanent migrants
no longer exists. As illustrated in Figure 2, as soon as workers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to migrate their preference is
to migrate and then return, so that workers with personal abilities below νRM stay at home while those with
abilities higher than νRM migrate in the ﬁrst period and return in the second period. However, in almost all
documented cases, even when return migration is relatively large, the majority of migrants still does not return
to their country of origin, and so we regard this second case as unlikely and focus on the relevant case in which
there are permanent migrants as well as returnees.
Before proceeding further we want to emphasize the role of p, the probability of migration, in aﬀecting the
schooling of each group. An increase in p in our model has two eﬀects. First, it will increase the slope of hMM∗
i
and therefore decrease the value of the threshold νS. This implies that a larger range of workers (those with
abilities between νS and ν) will get more schooling than before — this is the incentive eﬀect already pointed out
in the literature by Beine et al (2001) and Stark (2003). However, people in this group will also have a higher
probability of leaving — this is the classic brain drain eﬀect. The other eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei np, which is speciﬁc
to this model, is that it will also increase the slope of hMR∗
i and hence decrease the threshold νRM. This is a
double ”bonus” for the Home country because it will increase the share of returnees (those with ability between
νRM and ν) as well as their education for given ability ν. Hence, in a model in which there are prospects of
return migration that are linked to the human capital of the migrant, an increase in the probability of migrating
may have a signiﬁcant, positive impact on top of the incentive eﬀect: more international mobility will increase
the quality and the share of returnees12.
T h es i m p l em o d e lp r e s e n t e da b o v ea l l o w su st os o l v ef o rt h ea v e r a g el e v e lo fh u m a nc a p i t a lo fw o r k e r si n
the Home country. Given the simple (logarithmic) wage equations in (2), (3) and (4) once we know the human
capital level for an individual or a group we can easily compute their logarithmic wage. To make the model
operational and to derive expressions for average schooling and wages, we assume that the distribution of abilities
ν ∈ [0,ν] is uniform with density 1/ν. Moreover, the Home country population consists of two generations: the
young (denoted with the subscript 1) and the old (denoted with the subscript 2). The pre-migration size of each
generation at time t is denoted by φ1t and φ2t (for the young and the old, respectively) and the post-migration
size, which is relevant in order to compute average human capital (and average wages), is given by φ1t(1−m1t)
and φ2t(1 − m2t), respectively, where m1t and m2t are the shares of young and old living abroad. Therefore,
11Appendix 1 shows the derivation of average schooling in this case.
12The analytical derivation of the dependence of thresholds νS and νRM on p is shown in Appendix 2.
15the average human capital in the Home country in period t, ht, is given by the following expression:
ht =
φ1t(1 − m1t)h1t + φ2t(1 − m2t)h2t.
φ1t(1 − m1t)+φ2t(1 − m2t)
(17)
where h1t and h2t are the average levels of schooling of young and old people who live at Home. The young
are those who did not emigrate (either by choice or because they did not win the lottery) while the old are a
mixture of those who return and those who remained. In the next section we express the dependence of h1t and
h2t on the parameters of the model, and analyze in particular their dependence on the probability of migrating.
4.4 Average Human Capital and Wages
If there is no possibility of emigration (p = 0), everybody in the source country chooses the lowest level of
education as a function of her ability hS∗
i (νi). Average human capital in autarky would be the same in the













Now consider the case with positive probability of migration 0 <p<1. As noted above some workers
have an incentive to invest in more schooling and opt for emigration (possibly with return), depending on their
ability. The average human capital of those in the young generation remaining in the Home country depends on
the average human capital for three groups. Considering the relevant case (see section 5) in which νS <ν RM
13,
there will be a group of least educated who does not enter the lottery for migrating and pursues the lowest
possible level of education per ability. A second group gets an intermediate level of education and enters the
lottery but is not selected to migrate and a third group gets the highest education (with the prospect of migrating
and returning) but is not selected either. Expression (19) below shows the average human capital of the young
generation as a weighted average of the mean human capital in each of these three groups, where the weight is











(1 − p)(νRM − νS)







(1 − p)(¯ ν − νRM)
νS +( 1− p)(ν − νS)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (19) is the product of the average human capital of individuals
who prefer staying at Home (and hence do not participate in the lottery), given by 1
2hS∗(νS), and their share
13See the Appendix 1 for average human capital when νS >ν RM.
16in the total non-migrating young population, given by νS.
νS+(1−p)(ν−νS)
14. The second term contains the av-
erage human capital of workers who get an education, planning to migrate and remain abroad, but are not





, times their share in the non-migrating, young population
(1−p)(νRM−νS)
νS+(1−p)(ν−νS). The third term equals the product of average human capital for individuals who plan to migrate





, times their share in the non-migrating popu-
lation
(1−p)(¯ ν−νRM)
νS+(1−p)(ν−νS). The average human capital of the old generation in the Home country can be calculated
in a similar way. The only diﬀerence is that even the individuals who migrated, whose ability was between νRM












(1 − p)(νRM − νS)







(¯ ν − νRM).
νS +( 1− p)(νRM − νS)+(¯ ν − νRM)
The interpretation of the three terms on the right hand side of (20) is the same as in (19). In fact, the only
diﬀerence in the calculation of the shares is that in the old generation all workers in the [νRM,¯ ν]i n t e r v a la r e




If we substitute the expressions for hS∗,h MM∗ and hMR∗ from (14) into (19) and (20), we obtain the
following expressions, linking the average human capital of the young to the parameters and to the threshold
































(1 − p)(¯ ν2 − ν2
RM)
νS +( 1− p)(ν − νS)
































(¯ ν2 − ν2
RM)
νS +( 1− p)(νRM − νS)+(¯ ν − νRM)
14Because of the uniform distribution for abilities, the share is expressed by the simple ratio of the support of ν for the group
and the total support, accounting for the fact that in the interval [νs,ν] only a fraction (1 − p) ends up staying.
17In steady state, when parameter values and immigration policies are stable, one can calculate the average
human capital for the whole population by combining in expression (17) the average human capital of young
and old from (21) and (22), accounting for the fact thatt h es h a r eo fi n d i v i d u a l sw h oa r ei nt h eH o m ec o u n t r y
from the ﬁrst generation, (1 − m1), is equal to
νS+(1−p)(¯ ν−νs)
¯ ν and the share of individuals at Home from the
second generation, (1 − m1), is
νS+(1−p)(νRM−νS)+(¯ ν−νRM)
¯ ν .
Finally, to evaluate average wages in the Home economy, which provide a simple measure of income per
capita since labor is the only factor of production in the model, we can easily combine the average wage for
workers in each of the three groups (between 0 and νS , between νS and νRM and between νRM and ¯ ν)w e i g h t e d
by the share of that group among young/old workers (if we are calculating the average wage for a cohort) or in
the total population (if we are calculating the average wage (income per person) overall). Let us deﬁne wL1,
wM1 and wH1 as the average wage of workers with, respectively, low abilities (below νS), medium abilities
(between νS and νRM) and high abilities (above νRM) when they are young and with wL2 , wM2 and wH2
as their average wage when they are old. While the average wage and the size of the ﬁrst two groups are the
same when young or old, the average wage and the size of the third group (migrants who return) is diﬀerent
and we have to keep track of the fact that only a fraction (1 − p) of them is in the Home country when young
while the whole group is in the country when old. To avoid redundant notation we let wL1 = wL2 = wL and
wM1 = wM2 = wM and the average wage for the young generation w1, for the old generation w2 and overall w








(1 − p)(νRM − νS)





(1 − p)(¯ ν − νRM)









(1 − p)(νRM − νS)





(¯ ν − νRM)
νS +( 1− p)(νRM − νS)+(¯ ν − νRM)
¶
w =
φ1(1 − m1)w1 + φ2(1 − m2)w2.
φ1(1 − m1)+φ2(1 − m2)
(25)
where φ1and φ2 are the pre-migration populations of the currently young and old cohorts and (1−m1)a n d
(1−m2) are the shares of those cohorts in the Home country, which diﬀe rb yt h ef r a c t i o no fw o r k e r sw h or e t u r n .
Using the production function and expressions (2) and (4) to calculate individual wages (for those who stay and


























































Notice that the diﬀerence between wH1 and wH2 is the return of the share p of workers who were abroad
a n dw h oa r en o we n d o w e dw i t ht h ee x t r ap r o d u c t i v i t yt e r mηHκ in their human capital. Due to the exponential
dependence of wages on schooling and, in turn, abilities, it is easy to solve the integrals above. Expressions (38),
(39), (40) and (41) in Appendix 3 provide the analytical solutions to (26)-(29). In the next section we discuss
and simulate in detail the response of human capital and wages to diﬀerent migration policies emphasizing the
diﬀerential impact depending on ability, the role of migration costs and the relevance of migrants’ return.
5 Simulation of Migration Policies
The model presented above is quite stylized. Most of the variables analyzed within it, however, have a measurable
empirical counterpart. We can thus impose some structure by informing our choice of the parameters through
existing parameter estimates or features of the data . W ec a nt h e na s kt h em o d e lt op r o v i d ea tl e a s ts o m e
plausible magnitudes in the analysis of the eﬀects of migration policies on human capital and wages of the
Home country. To make things more plausible we think of Eastern Europe as the Home country and Western
Europe as the Foreign country in our simulation. Immigration policies can be seen as increasing progressively
the probability of migration p from 0 (in the late eighties) to the current rates of 10-15% of the population. Our
model allows us to identify the eﬀects of such policy changes on schooling and wages as well as the potential
eﬀects of increasing mobility further (for p above 0.15). More importantly, however, the model allows us to
evaluate the relative strength of the eﬀects produced by the ”pure drain from migration”, by the ”incentive
eﬀect from migration” and the new eﬀect stemming from ”incentives from migration and return” that is the
19relative innovation of this paper. Rather than taking too seriously the overall eﬀects, we intend to show how,
for plausible parameter values, the return channel induces important eﬀects on incentives, human capital and
wages, relative to migration without return. This allows us to discuss the option of using the ”return premium”
(κ in the model) as a possible migration policy instrument, which is possible to the extent that a country may
aﬀect the return to human capital accumulated abroad, or enhance the return to skills in order to induce a
reversal of the brain drain. Let us ﬁrst describe the parameter choice in the base case and in plausible variations
and then, in turn, we will discuss the eﬀects of increased international migration and the role of return migration.
5.1 Parameter Choice
Table 5 shows the choice of parameters that we use in our baseline simulation. They are obtained from the
literature or chosen to calibrate observed migration and return ﬂows. The ratio of labor productivity abroad
and at home, AH /AF, is set equal to 2 in order to capture the approximate relative productivity diﬀerences of
two to one, due to TFP and capital diﬀerences between the average Eastern European country and Germany-
UK (as representative of the West) measured in the late eighties and reported in Hall and Jones (1999). This
assumption implies that the diﬀerence in logarithmic productivity ln(AF)-l n ( AH), which is the term entering
all the relevant expressions in section 4, is equal to ln(2). We further take as returns to one year of schooling
the values of ηH =0 .04 and ηF =0 .08 for the Home and Foreign country, respectively. These values are based
on average returns to schooling in Poland and East Germany (for the East) and in Western Germany and the
UK (for the West) both taken around the early nineties, when the Iron Curtain collapsed. Those returns are
available at Hendricks (2004). The parameter κ is chosen so that the condition ηHκ − ηF > 0i ss a t i s ﬁed and
thus some highly educated workers would return. Given the choice of ηH and ηF the inequality implies that
κ should be larger than 2. As we documented in Section 3 above, return rates of 20-30% for migrants from
Eastern Europe to the US and the UK seems quite plausible. Hence κ is chosen as to deliver return migration
rates between 0.2 and 0.4 at the current migration rates; this turns out to be around 2.4. The pre-migration
sizes of the cohorts of young and old workers (φ1 and φ2) are both set equal to 0.5 (so that total population is
standardized to 1). The utility costs of residing abroad in the ﬁrst and second period of life, M1 and M2,a r e
chosen so as to generate two important features of the data. First, M1 + M2
1+δ > [ln(AF) − ln(AH)]2+δ
1+δ so that
the present discounted utility cost for the least skilled workers is higher than the present discounted beneﬁt
from migrating. This implies that at least for the least skilled worker it is too costly to migrate, and therefore
not everybody will migrate, even in the presence of no legal restrictions to migration. This reﬂects the fact
that a section of the population (likely to correspond to the group with lowest skills) will not migrate even
without migration barriers. Second, M2 < ln(AF) − ln(AH) so that not all emigrants will return in the second
period — again, while the percentage of returnees is possibly quite large, the majority of emigrants remains
20abroad for their whole life and this is a feature that we would like our model to mirror. The chosen parameter
values and the restrictions above imply that in all considered cases the threshold hS is strictly larger than 0
and the threshold hRM is strictly larger than hS. We show simulations with diﬀerent values of M1 and M2
near the inequality thresholds. The variable h is literally interpreted as years of schooling, while individual
ability ν (which clearly does not have a natural scale) is standardized to vary between a lower bound ν=0 and





1+δν,i se q u a lt oa
college education (16 years). Moreover, this standardization combined with the uniform distribution assumption
implies that the average years of schooling in autarky is equal to 8. This is a remarkably good approximation
for the Eastern European economies around the 1985-1990 period. The Barro and Lee (2000) dataset, in fact,
puts the average schooling in transitional economies in Eastern Europe at 8.5, with Poland at the low end of
the spectrum with an average of 6.8 in 1990 and East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia at the high end
with average schooling between 8.7 and 10.1 years. The parameter δ is chosen to be equal to 0.5 which implies
a yearly discount rate of 2% and a length of one period (half a working life in the model) of 20 years.
5.2 Baseline Case
Table 6 shows the eﬀect on average schooling and wages of progressively looser migration policies, corresponding
to higher probabilities of emigration, from 0 to 0.3. This covers most of the empirically relevant range—except
for some very small Caribbean islands and a few African countries no economy has emigration rates larger than
30%. This simulation is what we consider as the baseline case. In the simulation we use a utility cost of living
abroad equal to 1.5 times the logarithmic wage diﬀerential (1.5 ∗ ln(2)) between the rich and poor country and
a cost of remaining abroad in the second period equal to 0.67 (two thirds) of the logarithmic wage diﬀerential.
We choose the parameter κ to be 2.4. Under no migration the young generation (ﬁrst row), the old generation
(second row) and the overall population (third row) have 8 years of average schooling (primary completed).
Each row reports the level of h1, h2 and h as the probability of migration p increases moving from left to right.
Recall that eight years of schooling corresponds roughly to the average schooling for Eastern Europe in the
nineties. In the following three rows we report the average wages for the young cohort (w1), the old cohort (w2)
and the population overall (w). In order to identify the winners and losers of freer migration we also report, in
the following three rows, the average wage of each of the four relevant skill groups characterized by diﬀerent
education levels and migration behavior. Those with ability below νS (low) who do not pursue migration earn
wage wL (both while young and old) deﬁned by equation (26); those with ability between νS and νRM (medium)
who pursue migration and remain abroad if they manage to leave, earn wage wM (both while young and old)
deﬁned by condition (27); ﬁnally those with ability above νRM (high) who pursue migration and return earn
an average wage equal to wH1 (given by expression (28)) when young if they do not succeed in migrating. The
21whole cohort earns an average of wH2 when old which is inclusive of the returnees and those who stayed at home
and is deﬁned by expression (29). All average wages are standardized so that the average wage in the autarky
case equals 1. Hence it is easy to calculate from the reported numbers the percentage variation in wages with
migration policies as well as the relative wages across groups. Finally, the last two rows report the percentage of
total population living abroad (using emigration rates comparable to those measured by Docquier and Marfouk
2006) and the return rate — i.e., the percentage of total migrants who return.
The baseline case implies that workers with less than 3 years of schooling (hs =2 .88) will not pursue
migration, those with schooling between 2.88 years and 14.4 years pursue permanent migration while those
with more than 14.4 years will pursue migration and, if they are able to leave the country when young, they
will return to the home country when old (these values are reported in the footnote to Table 6). The overall
long-run eﬀect of a higher migration probability on average education is strictly positive in the chosen range.
Average education increases by 2.5 years going from no international mobility to signiﬁcant mobility, p =0 .3.
Such an increase is an average between an increase of 2 years of schooling for the young generation, due to the
incentive eﬀect generated by the possibility of migration, and an increase of 3 years for the old generation, whose
highly educated members have enhanced their human capital abroad. Even at p =0 .15, a moderate level of
international mobility, the average education gain relative to autarky is equal to 1.2 years. Such improvements
in average schooling produce an increase in the average wage (income per worker) of almost 10% in the case
p =0 .15 relative to autarky and of 29% in the case of p =0 .30. These are large gains. At a probability
of migrating equal to 0.15 the young generation has an average wage that is larger by 5% relative to autarky
simply due to the incentives to higher education, and the older generation, which includes high earning returnees,
receives an average wage 14% higher than in autarky. Keep in mind that these gains do not include the wage
gains of permanent migrants and are reached for actual emigration rates (last row) of 12.6% and rate of return
migration of 27%. Both of these are well within the range observed for Eastern European countries around
the year 2000. While our model assumes that the wage premium to human capital accumulated abroad is
particularly large for highly educated workers, the important message is that the combination of incentives and
return migration, for plausible values of returns to schooling and return rates is able to produce very positive
eﬀects on home-country education (and wages) in the long-run. In the considered range of migration probability
(0 to 0.3) the incentive-plus-return eﬀects more than oﬀset the drain eﬀect from selective migration. Figure 5a
shows the behavior of average human capital for the young generation, the old generation and their aggregate
as p varies between 0 and 1. Interestingly, we see that while the eﬀect of p on the human capital of the ﬁrst
generation is hump shaped, becoming negative for high values of p (because higher levels of schooling are coupled
with emigration of some of the most highly educated), the eﬀect on human capital of the second generation
is always positive and increasing with p. While only between 17 and 38% of emigrants return (see last row of
22Table 6), the fact that they are selected among the highly educated signiﬁcantly increases the human capital of
the old generation. In our simulation the positive eﬀect of mobility on the human capital of the old generation
dominates the eﬀect on the young generation. Even in the range of p where the eﬀect on the young generation
becomes negative, at high values of p, the average level of human capital h increases. In the plausible range,
between 0 and 0.3, which is the one detailed in Table 6, both generations, young and old, experience increasing
levels of average schooling as p increases.
R o w ss e v e nt ot e no fT a b l e6r e p o r tt h ew a g e so fd i ﬀerent groups of workers with low, medium and high
education. This last group is split between young, highly educated individuals, inclusive only of those who did
not migrate, and old, highly educated individuals, inclusive of those who remained plus the returnees. Recall
that the returnees have the extra wage premium due to their experience abroad. This implies that the average
wage of the older group is higher than that of the younger group. Looking at each group we see that the
average wage (and schooling) of the group with lowest abilities does not change much as p increases— in fact it
declines a bit. Migration incentives do not generate any change in education per unit of ability for this group
and selection produces lower average schooling (because the threshold νS decreases as p rises). The average
wage of the intermediate group also does not change much with p. This, however, is the result of two opposite
eﬀects. Higher p increases the schooling of each ability type, but it also produces a selection of individuals with
progressively lower abilities in the range of potential migrants (νS and νRM decrease). Finally, the two groups
with highest education experience the largest increase in wages (and schooling) as p increases because on the
one hand workers choose more schooling per unit of ability (eﬀect on wH1) and on top of that returnees receive
the enhanced returns κηH to schooling (eﬀect on wH2). Both the increase in average schooling (and wages) of
the group with ability above νRM and the increase in the size of this group relative to the others, produce the
positive eﬀect on average schooling and wages as p increases.
5.3 The Role of Incentives and Return Migration
The positive eﬀect on average human capital and wages illustrated in Table 6 results from the fact that the
education incentives plus the productivity premium for returnees reverse the negative impact of skilled migration.
It is interesting to know i) How large would the decrease in average human capital be, if the two positive
channels were not operating, and ii) How much of the human capital gains are due to incentives induced by
permanent migration and how much are due to the extra incentives and net gains added by the possibility of
return migration. In order to answer these questions we examine two alternative scenarios. Table 7a shows
the simulated wage and schooling eﬀects when we completely silence the return channel (by setting κ =1s o
that there is no return premium and therefore no return) but maintain the possibility of permanent migration
and its incentive eﬀect. Table 7b shows the diﬀerences between variables in this scenario and the baseline.
23T h e nT a b l e8 as h o w sw a g e sa n ds c h o o l i n gl e v e l sf o rt h ec a s eo fn oi n c e n t i v ee ﬀects of permanent migration (by
imposing a ﬁxed correspondence between ability and schooling level, unaﬀected by expected returns) and no
return migration. In this case, selective migration (as returns to schooling are still higher abroad) only produces
a drain of highly educated individuals. Table 8a shows the diﬀerences in the values of the relevant variables in
this scenario vis-a-vis the baseline. Keep in mind that since there is no return in either of the cases illustrated in
Table 7 or 8, the average wages (schooling) of the young and old are the same, and there are only two relevant
groups, those with ability below the migration threshold (νS) whose wage is denoted as wL,a n dt h o s ew i t h
ability above it whose wage is wH.
Three interesting facts emerge from the analysis in the tables. First, the incentive eﬀects of international
migration (Table 7) are strong enough to produce positive human capital and wage eﬀects on the Home country
for the parameter combination used in the baseline case and for reasonable values of p. Figure 5b shows the
eﬀect of incentives alone on average wages, namely the case reported in Table 7a. We see that only for very
high values of p (above 0.8) is the drain eﬀect large enough to cause a decrease in human capital. This is
interesting news since the positive incentive eﬀect is at times considered simply a theoretical curiosum, whereas
it seems quite plausible in our model. Second, with no incentive eﬀects nor return migration (Table 8a and
Figure 5c) there is instead a signiﬁcant reduction of average schooling as international mobility increases. This
is the standard brain drain eﬀect in the presence of selective migration. Under this scenario, for p =0 .3 average
schooling is half a year less than it would be in autarky and average wages are 2% smaller. Figure 5c shows the
negative eﬀect of free mobility on average Home wages under this scenario. Third, of the human capital and
wage diﬀerentials between the case with no incentive and nor e t u r na n dt h eb a s e l i n ec a s e( r e p o r t e di nT a b l e
8b), around 50 to 75% is due purely to the incentive mechanism created by the possibility of migration while
25 to 50% of the gains are due to to the return mechanism. For instance, with a probability p =0 .15 wages are
10% lower than the baseline case in the case with no incentive and no return (Table 8b), while they would be
only 5% lower in the case with incentives and no return (Table 7b). The group most severely penalized by the
lack of migration and return opportunity is, obviously, the group with highest ability. Its wage would be 33%
lower than the baseline at p =0 .15 while those with very low ability (below νS)w o u l dn o tl o s ea n y t h i n gf r o m
lack of return (or migration) opportunities because they would not take advantage of them anyway.
5.4 Sensitivity to Parameters
A very important parameter in determining the gains from and the incentives for return immigration is κ,t h e
proportional premium to schooling upon the migrant’s return to her home country. Its size (2.4) has been chosen
to generate, for the given values of other parameters, a return migration in the range of 20 to 35%. Table 9 shows
the values of schooling and wages when that parameter increases to 2.5. While we think of κ as a premium that
24the economy pays to returning migrants because of their higher human capital, one could also consider it as
a policy instrument. If a country rewards the human capital accumulated abroad and introduces incentives to
compensate returnees (high κ), this may generate an impact on their schooling, return and wages. Simulations
in Table 9 show that the small increase in κ (from 2.4 to 2.5) produces, already for p =0 .15, average schooling
of 9.3 years (plus 0.2 years relative to the baseline) and average wages of 1.13 (plus 3% relative to the baseline
case). The increased impact takes place mainly due to an increased eﬀect on the old generation as now a larger
share of emigrants returns. The variable most dramatically aﬀe c t e db yt h ei n c r e a s ei nκ i st h er a t eo fr e t u r n
migration (last row) now ranging between 38 and 54% (somewhat high but still comparable to the Dustmann
and Weiss (2007) estimates of return migration from the UK). Notice, importantly, that the increase in average
wages is mainly driven by the very large expansion of the group of highly educated who return. The average
wage of this group (reported in the rows of Table 9 headed by wH1 and wH2) is lower than in the baseline case.
This is due to the very large expansion of this group which now also contains workers with much lower ability
than before (lower νRM). For given ν the wage of workers is higher in this scenario than in the baseline case.
Table 10 shows the eﬀects of reducing migration costs in the ﬁrst period (M1) by 20% and Table 11 shows
the eﬀect of increasing the costs of staying abroad in the second period (M2) by around 20%. The impacts are
relatively small and as expected. In the ﬁrst case, shown in Table 10, cheaper migration induces more emigrants
and creates stronger incentives. The eﬀect, relative to the baseline case, is a larger emigration rate of the young
generation, and a very small increase in schooling and wages for each generation (again the extra incentive eﬀect
is larger than the extra drain eﬀect). In the second case, shown in Table 11, the higher cost of staying abroad
in the second period induces higher return rates but smaller emigration rates (relative to the baseline) with a
net eﬀect on schooling and wages of either generation that is almost null. In this case the return rate, however,
seems too large (between 60 and 70%) to be realistic.
6E x t e n s i o n s
6.1 Migration probability depends on schooling
An interesting extension to the model is to treat potential permanent and temporary migrants as facing diﬀerent
probabilities of migration. First, our self-selection model implies that those preferring migration with return
have higher schooling and most rich countries have immigration laws that make it easier for those people to
migrate. Second, temporary migration of the highly educated is deﬁnitely easier to pursue. Programs such as
H1B in the US (or higher education study and work visas) are non-immigration visas targeted exactly to this
purpose. For these reasons it makes sense to include in the model a variation in the probability term such
that those workers who choose (to enter the lottery for) permanent migration have a probability p1 of actually
25migrating, while those who prefer to migrate and return enter a lottery with probability p2 of succeeding, with
p2 >p 1. This modiﬁes the optimal schooling functions when people migrate, hMM∗
i , and when they migrate to
return, hRM∗
i . In particular, the ﬁrst will become a less steep function of ν so that the threshold νS increases and
selection of migrants becomes stronger, while the second becomes a steeper function of ν so that the threshold
νRM decreases and people with lower ability choose higher education, migration and return. Intuitively, now the
option of migrating and returning becomes more appealing because it carries a higher probability of occurring,
and it also becomes worthwhile for a larger range of abilities to pursue that route. Notice that the assumption
of the model is that individuals self-sort in one of the two lotteries (for temporary or permanent migration) and
that the sorting is done optimally, in the sense that each person chooses the lottery that maximizes expected
utility15.F o rl a r g ed i ﬀerences between p2 and p1 the case of no permanent migration can arise.
In Table 12 we analyze plausible cases which generate both temporary and permanent migrants. In par-
ticular we maintain a diﬀerence between p2 and p1 equal to 0.10 and we increase p1 from 0 to 0.25. In this
scenario the proportion of returning migrants increases substantially while permanent migrants as a share of
the population decrease. The human capital of the ﬁrst generation is slightly decreased relative to the baseline
(as the incentives for the young permanent migrant decrease relative to the baseline) but the human capital
of the second generation is increased (as a larger fraction migrates and returns)16. The average wage of the
old and highly educated is aﬀected the most by this change, as it is now higher since it includes more highly
paid returnees. In general, however, this example illustrates that many of the beneﬁts to average domestic
schooling and wages are still present even when migration policies discriminate between levels of education,
giving higher probability of success to highly educated prospective migrants who seek a temporary stay abroad.
Still fundamental to obtain such results is the presence of the incentives to return (high value of κ).
6.2 Human Capital Externalities
One reason why the migration of educated individuals is often considered very costly for the sending country is
that, either because of learning, technological adoption, ﬁscal contribution to productive public goods or other
reasons, there may be a positive externality of average human capital which would produce a larger income per
capita loss in the case of a decrease in the average human capital due to migration. An easy way of incorporating
this in our model is to think of a production function modiﬁed as follows:
Y = AH(χ)LHχ (30)
where labor productivity AH depends on average human capital χ. This is a popular speciﬁcation used, for
15If we were to allow an individual to participate in both lotteries at the same time and choose the preferred outcome, then we
should modify slightly the analysis. The qualitative implications, however, would be the same.
16We compare the variables in the baseline case in which p corresponds to the average of p1 and p2 for the current case.
26instance, in Acemoglu and Angrist (2001). It is useful to specify the term AH as a simple exponential function of
the average schooling (h)d e ﬁn e di ne x p r e s s i o n( 1 7 )w i t ht h ep a r a m e t e rγ capturing the intensity of the human











reﬂects the fact that productivity of the Home country depends on its average human
capital (an exponential function of its average schooling) with an elasticity of γηH that we call ζ for brevity.
The parameter γ expresses the intensity of the external returns as a share of the private returns ηH while ζ
expresses the strength of the externality as the external return to one year of schooling. The empirical literature
(Rauch 1993, Acemoglu and Angrist 2001, Ciccone and Peri 2006) provides us with plausible estimates of this
parameter. The logarithm of the wage of an individual with schooling hi i nt h eH o m ec o u n t r yi s :
ln(wHi)=l n ( AH)+ζh + ηHhi (32)
The externality aﬀects individual logarithmic wages by adding to it a linear term in average schooling. This
is the way in which such an externality is modelled in Acemoglu and Angrist 2001. Similarly, the wage of a
returnee with human capital hi is:
ln(wHi)=l n ( AH)+ζh + κηHhi (33)
We assume that the Foreign country is large enough that migration does not aﬀect its average human capital
so that the wage in the Foreign country remains as in expression (3). There are two ways in which the externality
aﬀects the immigration decision and thus wages. First, if — as we saw above — immigration increases (through
incentives and return) the average schooling in the Home country, this eﬀe c t ,i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fa ne x t e r n a l i t y ,
pushes up wages to a larger extent for all and fewer people will have incentives to migrate. Second, for the same
amount of migration, with a positive externality we would observe a larger positive average wage eﬀect.
In order to solve for the equilibrium value of h i nt h eH o m ec o u n t r yw eﬁrst substitute expressions (32) and
(33) into the utility function (6) and solve the maximization problem to ﬁnd the threshold values νS and νRM
as a function of h and parameters. Then, substituting (21) and (22) into the expression (17) we obtain average
schooling h as a function of the thresholds νS and νRM w h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n do nh. This implicit equation,
numerically solved for the baseline parameter values, produces the equilibrium value of average schooling.
Table 13 shows the schooling and wage levels in this case. In particular, we choose a value for the parameter
ζ =0 .02 (one extra year of average schooling increases productivity by 2%) which implies external returns to
27schooling equal to half of their private return. This is a plausible value, hard to reject even by the estimates
obtained in the more conservative studies (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001 and Ciccone and Peri 2006). Moreover,
we now calibrate ln(AH)+ζh , which represents the new productivity term in the Home country, to be equal
to ln(ϕ). There are two main eﬀects of the schooling externalities. First, as the incentive and return channels
increase average schooling, the externality pushes up everybody’s wages and reduces the incentive to further
migration. Hence, overall migration rates are reduced and the net eﬀect on average schooling at each level of p
is smaller than in the case of no migration. Second, due to the externality, even this smaller increase in average
schooling generates a higher increase in the wages of each group (due to the external eﬀect).
Both eﬀects are visible, though small, in Table 13. The average schooling for p =0 .30 is 10.50 (compared
to 10.53 in Table 6) years of schooling, but the average wage is 1.37 (compared to 1.29 in Table 6) due to a
gain, through the externality, for all workers. As in our baseline, migration and return generate a positive net
schooling eﬀect, and the presence of a human capital externality reduces the migration needed to eliminate
wage incentives for Home residents to migrate. It attenuates migration and increases wages. If the net schooling
eﬀect of migration was negative, however, schooling externalities would reinforce the tendency to migrate (since
migration would reduce the wage of those remaining, pushing them to migrate even more) and possibly induce
a vicious out-migration cycle.
7 Conclusions
This paper considers return migration as an important phenomenon if we want to quantify precisely the eﬀects
of increased international mobility of the highly educated on the wages and human capital of middle income
countries with signiﬁcant migration of skilled workers. We document that for regions such as Eastern Europe
and Asia return migration may imply that 20 to 30% of highly educated emigrants return home when they are
still productive and contribute importantly to the average income and wages of the sending country. We develop
an overlapping generations model that allows us to consider the incentive eﬀect of migration on schooling, as
well as the choice of migrating permanently or migrating and returning. We parametrize the model to match
typical productivity and returns to schooling in Eastern Europe (Home) and Western Europe (Foreign) as well
as the observed percentages of return migrants. We demonstrate three main results. First, we show that the
incentive and return eﬀects together reverse the drain eﬀect of selective migration so that average schooling and
wages in Eastern Europe would increase with freer mobility. This is because the prospect of migrating increases
schooling for most individuals and, among the highly educated, a relevant share returns. Second, the return
motive adds to the incentive motive if there is a wage premium for returnees. Considering the return option (on
top of the schooling incentives) generates in our simulations an additional positive eﬀect on the human capital
and wage gains from international mobility that amounts to about 25% of the gains from the incentive eﬀect
28only. Finally, a crucial parameter to quantify the incentive of returning migrants is the wage premium obtained
by returnees. There is anecdotal evidence that workers with international experience receive a signiﬁcant wage
premium when they return to their middle income countries of origin. More research is needed to measure this
eﬀect precisely and to evaluate the countries in which return migrants receive the largest premium and are,
therefore, more likely to be a large fraction of the emigrants.
298 Appendix 1: Average Human Capital and Wages When νRM <ν S.
I nt h ec a s eo fνRM <ν S, there is no permanent migration: those with ability below νRM do not opt for the
lottery and stay at Home, while those with ability above migrate, if they win the lottery, and return (Figure 4).
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Appendix 2: The Derivatives of νRM and νS with respect to p.
An increase in emigration probability p decreases the ability thresholds for permanent and temporary migration







M1(1 + δ)+M2 − (ln(AF) − ln(AH))(2 + δ)
(2 + δ)(ηF − ηH)
(ηF − ηH)
(ηH + p(ηF − ηH))2,
which is negative for M1 + M2
1+δ > (ln(AF) − ln(AH))2+δ




ln(AF) − ln(AH) − M2
ηHκ − ηF
2+δ




1+δ(ηH + p(ηF − ηH)) + 1
1+δp(ηHκ − ηF)
´2,
which is negative for ln(AF) − ln(AH) >M 2, ηF >η H and ηHκ>η F.
30Appendix 3: Average Wages by Group, Explicit Solution.
Calculating the integral, and solving for the average wages of the low-, middle- and high-skilled in (26)-(29)
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Figure 1 
Share of surviving immigrants entered in 1975-79 remaining in the US, Males 
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Note: Authors’ calculation using IPUMS 1980-90-00 and ACS 2005. The year of entry in the US is identified by the variable YRIMMIG, consistently reported 
from 1980. The size of the initial cohort is scaled every year accounting for the mortality rates specific to the age group and sex for the relevant decade. The 
mortality rates by age group and sex are from the national center for Health statistics, Data Warehouse, Table HIST_290.   36
 
Figure 2 
Share of surviving immigrants entered in 1975-79 remaining in the US, Males and Females 
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Note: Authors’ calculation using IPUMS 1980-90-00 and ACS 2005. The year of entry in the US is identified by the variable YRIMMIG, consistently reported 
from 1980. The size of the initial cohort is scaled every year accounting for the mortality rates specific to the age group and sex for the relevant decade. The 
mortality rates by age group and sex are from the national center for Health statistics, Data Warehouse, Table HIST_290. 
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Figure 3 
Optimal Schooling and Migration Decisions as a Function of Personal Abilities 
 
    
 
 
Note: The relationship between abilities ν and schooling h depends on the expected returns to schooling. The flattest line represents the relationship 
for workers who do not emigrate, the intermediate one for those who migrate and remain abroad and the steepest one for those who migrate and 
return. The threshold νS identifies the ability level below which workers prefer staying, while above it they prefer participating in the migration 
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Figure 4 





Note: The above figure represents the configuration of parameters for which the ability level νRM represents the threshold for migrating and 
returning, so that workers with higher ability are all temporary migrants in the sense that they spend one period abroad and come back to the Home 
country in the second period. This configuration arises for values of ηF close to ηH  and for large values of κ. 
 
 




























Note: Simulated average schooling for the young generation (h1), the old generation (h2) and overall for probability of succeeding to 
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Figure 5b 
Average schooling of the young, old and overall as a function of emigration probability – 







Note: Simulated average schooling for the young generation (h1), the old generation (h2) and overall for probability of succeeding to 
migrate (p) ranging from 0 to 1. The possibility of return migration is ruled out in this simulation. The parameter values used to obtain 
the figures are the same as those used in Table 7.
h1=h2=h 
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Figure 5c 
Average schooling of the young, old and overall as a function of emigration probability – 





Note: Simulated average schooling for the young generation (h1), the old generation (h2) and overall for probability of succeeding to 
migrate (p) ranging from 0 to 1. The schooling decision is independent of future returns, hence migration has no incentive effects on 
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Table 1: Long-term permanence rates of immigrants in US, Arrival Cohort 1975-79, 




Note: Authors’ calculation using IPUMS 1980-90-00 and ACS 2005. The year of entry in the US is 
identified by the variable YRIMMIG, consistently reported from 1980. The size of the initial cohort is 
scaled every year accounting for the mortality rates specific to the age group and sex for the relevant 
decade. The mortality rates by age group and sex are from the national center for Health statistics, 
Data Warehouse, Table HIST_290. The education variable used is educrec, and if it is larger than 7 




  In 1980  In 1990  In 2000  In 2005 
Cohort aged 13-18 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.94 0.96 0.88 
Females  1  0.91 0.99 0.92 
Total  1  0.93 0.98 0.90 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.24 0.37 0.38 0.40 
Cohort aged 18-22 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.84 0.89 0.83 
Females  1  0.84 0.93 0.88 
Total  1  0.84 0.91 0.86 
Share of people with 
some college education 
0.42 0.44 0.43 0.44 
Cohort aged 23-28 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.78 0.78 0.76 
Females  1  0.88 0.87 0.87 
Total  1  0.82 0.82 0.81 
Share of remining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.46 0.49 0.47 0.49 
Cohort aged 28-32 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.81 0.72 0.75 
Females  1  0.87 0.84 0.86 
Total  1  0.84 0.77 0.81 
Share of remining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.42 0.45 0.43 0.46 
All cohorts aged 13-32 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.82 0.81 -- 
Females  1  0.87 0.89 -- 
Total  1  0.84 0.85 -- 
Share of remining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.43 0.44 0.43 --   43
 
Table 2: Long-term permanence rates of immigrants in US, Arrival Cohort 1975-79, 
Immigrants from Eastern Europe 
 
 
Note: Authors’ calculation using IPUMS 1980-90-00 and ACS 2005. The year of entry in the US is 
identified by the variable YRIMMIG, consistently reported from 1980. The size of the initial cohort is 
scaled every year accounting for the mortality rates specific to the age group and sex for the relevant 
decade. The mortality rates by age group and sex are from the national center for Health statistics, 
Data Warehouse, Table HIST_290. The education variable used is educrec, and if it is larger than 7 
people are classified as having some college education. Immigrants from Eastern Europe-Russia are 




  In 1980  In 1990  In 2000  In 2005 
Cohort aged 13-17 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.95 0.99 1.32 
Females  1  0.85 0.71 0.71 
Total  1  0.88 0.79 0.89 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.26 0.50 0.47 0.67 
Cohort aged 18-22 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.78 0.98 0.88 
Females  1  0.72 0.68 0.93 
Total  1  0.74 0.81 0.91 
Share of people with 
some college education 
0.51 0.50 0.55 0.66 
Cohort aged 23-27 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.72 0.70 0.65 
Females  1  0.81 0.87 0.72 
Total  1  0.77 0.79 0.69 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.50 0.61    0.57 0.64 
Cohort aged 28-32 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.75 0.42 0.76 
Females  1  0.47 0.69 0.62 
Total  1  0.60 0.56 0.69 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.52 0.58 0.54 0.54 
All cohorts aged 13-32 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.72 0.80 -- 
Females  1  0.72 0.79 -- 
Total  1  0.72 0.79 -- 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.49 0.55 0.53 --   44
 
Table 3: Long-term permanence rates of immigrants in US, Arrival Cohort 1975-79, 




Note: Authors’ calculation using IPUMS 1980-90-00 and ACS 2005. The year of entry in the US is 
identified by the variable YRIMMIG, consistently reported from 1980. The size of the initial cohort is 
scaled every year accounting for the mortality rates specific to the age group and sex for the relevant 
decade. The mortality rates by age group and sex are from the national center for Health statistics, 
Data Warehouse, Table HIST_290. The education variable used is educrec, and if it is larger than 7 
people are classified as having some college education. Immigrants from Asia are identified as those 
whose country of birth variable (BPL) has values between 500 and 525. 
 
  In 1980  In 1990  In 2000  In 2005 
Cohort aged 13-18 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.87 0.93 0.78 
Females  1  0.76 0.94 0.87 
Total  1  0.82 0.94 0.82 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.36 0.70 0.72 0.72 
Cohort aged 18-22 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.87 0.94 0.90 
Females  1  0.82 0.91 0.88 
Total  1  0.84 0.92 0.89 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.60 0.70 0.67 0.70 
Cohort aged 23-28 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.82 0.85 0.82 
Females  1  0.95 0.93 0.97 
Total  1  0.89 0.89 0.89 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.62 0.67 0.66 0.69 
Cohort aged 28-32 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.84 0.78 0.87 
Females  1  0.88 0.89 0.94 
Total  1  0.86 0.84 0.90 
Share of remining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.56 0.62 0.58 0.60 
All cohorts aged 13-32 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.85 0.87 -- 
Females  1  0.89 0.92 -- 
Total  1  0.87 0.90 -- 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.58 0.64 0.62 --   45
 
 
Table 4: Long-term permanence rates of immigrants in US, Arrival Cohort 1975-79, 




Note: Authors’ calculation using IPUMS 1980-90-00 and ACS 2005. The year of entry in the US is 
identified by the variable YRIMMIG, consistently reported from 1980. The size of the initial cohort is 
scaled every year accounting for the mortality rates specific to the age group and sex for the relevant 
decade. The mortality rates by age group and sex are from the national center for Health statistics, 
Data Warehouse, Table HIST_290. The education variable used is educrec, and if it is larger than 7 
people are classified as having some college education. Immigrants from Latin America are identified 
as those whose country of birth variable (BPL) has values between 200 and 300. 
  In 1980  In 1990  In 2000  In 2005 
Cohort aged 13-18 when immigrated 
Males  1  1.11 1.21 1.13 
Females  1  1.11 1.28 1.19 
Total  1  1.11 1.24 1.16 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.12 0.20 0.20 0.23 
Cohort aged 18-22 when immigrated 
Males  1  1.01 1.10 1.06 
Females  1  1.03 1.20 1.11 
Total  1  1.02 1.14 1.08 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.20 0.21 0.20 0.23 
Cohort aged 23-28 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.84 1.23 0.85 
Females  1  0.93 1.26 1.01 
Total  1  0.88 1.24 0.98 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23 
Cohort aged 28-32 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.89 0.87 0.89 
Females  1  1.07 1.05 1.03 
Total  1  0.98 0.95 0.96 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.17 0.20 0.21 0.22 
All cohorts aged 13-32 when immigrated 
Males  1  0.95 0.99 -- 
Females  1  1.03 1.10 -- 
Total  1  0.98 1.01 -- 
Share of remaining 
immigrants with some 
college education 
0.19 0.20 0.21 --   46
 
Table 5: Choice of Parameters. 
 
 
Baseline AF A H  φ  ηF  ηH  κ  Φ1 
 2  φ  φ 1  0.08  0.04  2.4  0.5 
  Φ2  θ  δ  ν  ν M 1 M 2 




Table 6:  
Migration probability and source-country variables.  Baseline scenario. 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
Schooling 
h1; Average 
schooling of young 
8  8.34 8.68 9.03 9.37 9.78  10.03 
h2; Average 
schooling of old 
8  8.39 8.84 9.32 9.84  10.39  10.97 
h: Average 
schooling 
8  8.37 8.76 9.18 9.61  10.06  10.53 
Wages 
w1
a  1  1.01 1.03 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.10 
w2
a  1  1.03 1.08 1.14 1.22 1.33 1.45 
w
 a  1  1.02 1.05 1.09 1.15 1.21 1.29 
wL  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 
wM  1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
wH1  1.31 1.33 1.36 1.38 1.41 1.44 1.47 
wH2
a  1.31 1.43 1.56 1.71 1.87 2.05 2.26 
Migration rates 
Share  of  emigrants  0  0.041 0.083 0.126 0.169 0.213 0.258 
Share of Returnees 
among emigrants 
  0.177 0.228 0.274 0.314 0.351 0.383 
Note: We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration. 




















Table 7a  
Case with no Return Migration. 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
h1; Average 
schooling of young 
8  8.32 8.64 8.95 9.26 9.55 9.83 
h2; Average 
schooling of old 
8  8.32 8.64 8.95 9.26 9.55 9.83 
h: Average 
schooling 
8  8.32 8.64 8.95 9.26 9.55 9.83 
w1 = w2  =  w  1  1.01 1.03 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.09 
wL  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 
wM = wH1= wH2  1.05 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.13 1.15 1.17 
Share  of  emigrants  0  0.041 0.083 0.126 0.169 0.213 0.258 
Share of Returnees 
among emigrants 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Same parameter values as in baseline, except for κ=1.  
We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration.  
There is a single threshold value, hS=2.88, and individuals with schooling above that level attempt to 
migrate and, if  they succeed, they remain abroad. 
 
 
Table 7b:  
Case with no Return migration; Differences with the Baseline. 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
h1; Average 
schooling  of  young  0  -0.01 -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 -0.15 -0.20 
h2; Average 
schooling  of  old  0  -0.07 -0.19 -0.36 -0.58 -0.83 -1.13 
h: Average 
schooling  0  -0.04 -0.12 -0.22 -0.35 -0.51 -0.69 
w1  0  -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
w2  0  -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.16 -0.25 -0.36 
w
   0  -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.13 -0.19 
wL  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
wM  0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.16 
wH1  -0.26 -0.26 -0.27 -0.27 -0.28 -0.29 -0.30 
wH2  -0.26 -0.36 -0.47 -0.60 -0.74 -0.90 -1.08 
Share of emigrants  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Share of Returnees 
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Table 8a: Case with no return migration and no incentive effects 
 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
h1; Average 
schooling of young 
8  7.93 7.87 7.79 7.71 7.62 7.52 
h2; Average 
schooling of old 
8  7.93 7.87 7.79 7.71 7.62 7.52 
h: Average 
schooling 
8  7.93 7.87 7.79 7.71 7.62 7.  52 
w1 = w2  =  w  1  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 
wL 0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
wM = wH1= wH2 1.05 1.05  1.05  1.05  1.05  1.05  1.05 
Share  of  emigrants  0  0.040 0.081 0.122 0.163 0.204 0.245 
Share of Returnees 
among emigrants 
 0   0  0  0  0  0 
The relationship between ability ν and schooling is fixed and equal to that of no migration from the 
baseline case. Parameter  κ=1. The remaining parameters are as in the baseline case. 
We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration . 
There is a single threshold value, hS=2.88, and individuals with schooling above that level attempt to 
migrate and, if  they succeed, they remain abroad. 
 
 
Table 8b:  
Case with no return migration and no incentive effects 
Differences with the Baseline 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
h1; Average 
schooling of young  0  -0.40 -0.81 -1.23 -1.65 -2.08 -2.50 
h2; Average 
schooling of old  0  -0.46 -0.96 -1.52 -2.12 -2.76 -3.44 
h: Average 
schooling  0  -0.43 -0.89 -1.38 -1.89 -2.43 -3.01 
w1  0  -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 
w2  0  -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.23 -0.34 -0.47 
w
   0  -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.16 -0.22 -0.30 
wL  0  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
wM  0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
wH1  -0.26 -0.28 -0.31 -0.33 -0.36 -0.39 -0.41 
wH2  -0.26 -0.37 -0.51 -0.65 -0.82 -1.01 -1.20 
Share of emigrants  0  -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 
Share of Returnees 
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Table 9: Case with higher skill premium for returnees 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
h1; Average 
schooling of young 
8  8.36 8.73 9.10 9.46 9.81  10.15 
h2; Average 
schooling of old 
8 8.46  8.96  9.48  10.03  10.60  11.19 
h: Average 
schooling 
8  8.41 8.85 9.30 9.76  10.23  10.72 
w1
a  1  1.01 1.03 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.11 
w2
a  1  1.04 1.11 1.19 1.29 1.41 1.56 
w
 a  1  1.03 1.07 1.12 1.18 1.26 1.35 
wL  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 
wM  0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 
wH1  1.24 1.26 1.29 1.31 1.34 1.37 1.39 
wH2  1.24 1.35 1.47 1.62 1.78 1.96 2.16 
Share  of  emigrants  0  0.041 0.083 0.126 0.169 0.213 0.258 
Share of Returnees 
among emigrants 
  0.385 0.425 0.460 0.491 0.519 0.544 
Note: We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration  




Table 10: Case with lower cost of migration in the first period 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
h1; Average 
schooling of young 
8  8.39 8.79 9.20 9.61  10.02  10.43 
h2; Average 
schooling of old 
8 8.45  8.95  9.49  10.08  10.70  11.36 
h: Average 
schooling 
8  8.42 8.87 9.35 9.85  10.38  10.93 
w1  1  1.01 1.03 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.11 
w2  1  1.03 1.08 1.15 1.24 1.35 1.48 
w
   1  1.02 1.06 1.10 1.16 1.22 1.31 
wL  0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 
wM  0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 
wH1  1.31 1.33 1.36 1.38 1.41 1.44 1.47 
wH2  1.31 1.43 1.56 1.71 1.87 2.05 2.26 
Share  of  emigrants  0  0.047 0.095 0.143 0.191 0.239 0.288 
Share of Returnees 
among emigrants 
  0.154 0.200 0.241 0.279 0.313 0.343 
Note: We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration  
Same parameter values as in baseline, except for M1=1.3 ln(2).  










Table 11: Case with higher cost of staying abroad in the second period 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
h1; Average 
schooling of young 
8  8.34 8.69 9.03 9.35 9.67 9.97 
h2; Average 
schooling of old 
8  8.45 8.93 9.42 9.92  10.43  10.96 
h: Average 
schooling 
8  8.40 8.81 9.23 9.66  10.08  10.51 
w1  1  1.01 1.03 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.10 
w2  1  1.05 1.11 1.19 1.28 1.39 1.51 
w
   1  1.03 1.07 1.12 1.18 1.25 1.32 
wL  0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.75 
wM  0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 
wH1  1.17 1.19 1.22 1.24 1.26 1.29 1.32 
wH2  1.17 1.26 1.36 1.47 1.59 1.74 1.89 
Share  of  emigrants  0  0.038 0.078 0.118 0.160 0.202 0.245 
Share of Returnees 
among emigrants 
  0.631 0.657 0.679 0.699 0.716 0.732 
Note: We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration  
Same parameter values as in baseline, except for M2=0.8 ln(2).  
The threshold values are: hS=3.81, hRM=8.66. 
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0  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
p2  (Temporary 
Migration) 
0  0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 
h1; Average 
schooling of young 
8  8.16 8.53 8.88 9.22 9.55 9.86 
h2; Average 
schooling of old 
8  8.32 8.82 9.35 9.90  10.48  11.09 
h: Average 
schooling 
8  8.24 8.67 9.12 9.58  10.04  10.52 
w1
a  1  1.01 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.09 
w2
a  1  1.05 1.11 1.19 1.29 1.41 1.55 
w
 a  1  1.03 1.07 1.12 1.18 1.25 1.34 
wL
a  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.74 
wM
a  1.01 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
wH1
a  1.31 1.36 1.38 1.41 1.44 1.47 1.50 
wH2
a  1.31 1.56 1.71 1.87 2.05 2.26 2.48 
Share  of  emigrants  0  0.019 0.064 0.110 0.156 0.202 0.249 
Share of Returnees 
among emigrants 
  1  0.537 0.484 0.479 0.488 0.501 
Note: We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration.  
Same parameter values as in baseline, except for different probability of migrating in the “temporary 
migration” or in the “permanent migration” lottery. 
The threshold values are: hS=2.88, hRM=14.44. 
 
 
Table 13: Case with schooling externalities 
 
p  0  0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 
h1; Average 
schooling of young 
8  8.33 8.67 9.01 9.34 9.66 9.96 
h2; Average 
schooling of old 
8  8.41 8.86 9.34 9.86  10.40  10.91 
h: Average 
schooling 
8  8.37 8.77 9.18 9.61  10.05  10.50 
w1
a  1  1.02 1.04 1.07 1.10 1.12 1.15 
w2
a  1  1.04 1.10 1.19 1.29 1.42 1.56 
w
 a  1  1.03 1.07 1.13 1.20 1.28 1.37 
wL
a  0.75 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.79 
wM
a  1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
wH1
a  1.31 1.33 1.35 1.38 1.40 1.43 1.45 
wH2
a  1.31 1.42 1.55 1.68 1.82 1.98 2.15 
Share  of  emigrants  0  0.040 0.081 0.121 0.161 0.201 0.240 
Share of Returnees 
among emigrants 
  0.213 0.301 0.382 0.457 0.525 0.588 
Note: We standardized all the wages to be relative to the average wage in the case of no emigration. 
Same parameter values as in baseline, except for the presence of a schooling externality, as described 
in the main text. The parameter capturing the intensity of human capital externalities is set to ζ=0.02.  
The threshold values, hS and hRM are now functions of p. 
 
 
 